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INTRODUCTION
Sex inequality still exists. However, its manifestations have evolved
since the early sex inequality cases were heard in courts and legislatures
first began structuring statutory regimes to combat it. In particular, so-
called "facial" discrimination against men and women on the basis of sex
has no doubt decreased since the advent of this legal assault on sex ine-
quality. Yet the gendered assumptions that structure our institutions and
interactions have proven resilient. With sex discrimination now operat-
ing more covertly, the problem of sex inequality looks considerably
different than it once did. Courts, however, have failed to successfully
respond to the changing contours of sex inequality, allowing the prob-
lem to manifest itself in ways that are becoming increasingly difficult to
identify and root out.
This Article proposes that courts formulate an alternative legal
framework within which to understand the problem of sex inequality
such that they are better equipped to address its evolving nature-a
framework which unambiguously names bad ideology, not simply bad
actors and differential treatment, as sex equality's nemesis. Through such
* J.D., magna cum laude, University of Michigan Law School, 2010; B.S., summa cum
laude, Northwestern University, 2006. Special gratitude to Professor Margaret Jane
Radin for her guidance, encouragement, and empathy.
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a renaming and reframing, U.S. law might become a more effective are-
na for negotiating the gendered assumptions that underlie the problem
of sex inequality, should space be made within its discourse for such a
conversation to take place.
Generally considered the centerpiece of U.S. equality legislation,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' is an appropriate starting
point for testing the workability of this alternative legal framework. In
its call for national equality, Congress declared with the passage of the
Act that no adverse employment decision may be made "because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."2 But the con-
tours of Congress's vision of equality are not entirely decipherable
through the statute's text or legislative history, and so have been hotly
contested in U.S. courts for decades.3 The Congressional Record shows,
for example, that the addition of "sex" as an impermissible basis of dis-
tinction under Title VII was added at the last minute by a senator
seeking to sabotage the Amendment.' Thus from its inception, the pre-
cise mandate of Title VII with regard to ending sex discrimination in
particular has been especially unclear.' It has therefore been left to the
courts to define the contours of a regime targeted at combating sex ine-
quality with only this broad purposive intent in mind.
As courts have struggled to identify what constitutes "sex discrimi-
nation" in Title VII cases, they have developed a discourse-marked by
philosophies, lines of inquiry and legal frameworks-which attempts to
describe the problem of sex inequality in legal terms. In this effort,
courts have overwhelmingly defaulted to a discourse of categorical com-
parison for addressing questions of sex inequality. They ask as their
central inquiry in any sex discrimination case: Has a member of the pro-
tected class (generally, woman) been treated "differently" than persons of
another class (generally, man), even though both members are "the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2010).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2010).
3. See NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 77A:17 (6th
ed. 2009).
4. Howard Smith, who chaired the House Rules Committee and strongly opposed the
Civil Rights Act, suggested the addition of "sex" to Title VII's list of protected classes
in what is commonly described as a cynical attempt to defeat the bill by inserting ob-
jectionable amendments. See Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII: Persistent
Opportunism as a Maker ofPublic Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163, 163-84 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) ("The prohibition
against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute on the
floor of the House of Representatives . . . the bill quickly passed as amended, and we
are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition
against discrimination based on 'sex.'").
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same?"6 Not only has this inquiry produced inconsistent and, at times,
absurd results, but it has also spurred an arguably undesirable impetus
for the multiplication of new protected categories. In their attempt to
achieve legal acknowledgment of their experiences of discrimination,
plaintiffs of different "classes" are now lobbying for explicit reference to
their "category" in various pieces of equality legislation. Not surprising-
ly, the prospect of a never-ending list of protected categories has been
met with resistance, even irritation, by courts and legislatures alike.!
The current legal discourse surrounding Title VII fails to do justice
to the complexity of the problem of sex inequality because courts lack a
legal framework that can be applied consistently and broadly to Title
VII sex discrimination cases, without it resulting inevitably in the inces-
sant multiplication of protected categories. This Article therefore
attempts to demonstrate the workability of an alternative legal frame-
work for adjudicating Title VII litigation. Within this framework,
problems of sex inequality can be more effectively assessed and ad-
dressed without descending into the feared endless relativism of
proliferating categories.
This Article proposes that "gender ideology" become the central
concept through which sex inequality is understood by courts and liti-
gants.9 Gender ideology, as that term is used in this Article, refers to the
6. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEx EQUALITY 6 (2007) [hereinafter MACKINNON,
SEx EQUALITY] (discussing the comparative features of conventional equality law
which requires same treatment if one is the same, different treatment if one is differ-
ent, and concluding that where "equality is like treatment for likes, inequality means
different treatment for likes, same treatment for unlikes."). MacKinnon refers to this
classic conception of equality as the "sameness/difference" approach.
7. In response to courts' focus on legally protected categories, there have been move-
ments-both successful and unsuccessful-to add, for example, "sexual
orientation", "gender identity", and "transsexuality" as protected classes under state
civil rights statutes. For a comprehensive listing of these efforts, see State Legislation
Listing, THE HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/laws-and-elections/
state_1egislation _isting.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). On June 24, 2009, the
Employment Non-discrimination Act of 2009 ("ENDA") was introduced in Con-
gress to prohibit discrimination based on "sexual orientation" and "gender identity"
at the federal level. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017,
111th Cong. (2009).
8. See, e.g., Degraffenreid v. GM Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo.
1976) (expressing concern that recognizing a special class of "black women" would
create a new special sub-category and a new "super-remedy" giving plaintiffs relief be-
yond which the drafters of Title VII intended); Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770,
780 (D.D.C. 1986) (warning against the "many-headed Hydra" that could be created
by multiplying subgroups under Title VII).
9. This Article assumes a distinction between the terms "sex" and "gender": "Sex" being
the term used to describe a person's biological identity, as either a man or a woman;
"Gender" being the socially constructed way we understand masculinity and
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system of ideas which relies upon assumptions about the naturalness,
inevitability, and propriety of sex inequality-that is, masculine domi-
nance and feminine subordination-as well as the stability of sex/gender
coincidence.o "Ideology" in this sense can be understood as a set of
myths that the ideology itself intends to naturalize as immovable facts
not to be contested-a system of "illusions endemic to social reality.""
Ideology is not reality and need not (in fact should not) be accepted as a
description of reality for one to nonetheless accept that it wields the
power to govern reality.'2
Like any form of ideology, gender ideology is normative: it seeks to
maintain blind acceptance of its underlying assumptions-about men
and masculinity and women and femininity-by enforcing punitive
consequences on those who challenge those assumptions. These chal-
lenges come in many forms, including subversive conduct, speech, and
thought, or even an individual's mere presence in a spatial or social loca-
tion. And punitive consequences for those challenges are delivered in
just as many forms-economic deprivation; political disenfranchise-
ment; social humiliation; emotional, sexual, and physical abuse. This
Article focuses on the operation of gender ideology in the employment
context and how that ideology can be addressed through Title VII litiga-
tion. For example, a gender ideology analysis recognizes that the mere
presence of women in the workplace-where they have the opportunity
femininity to map onto human beings. See, e.g., MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra
note 6, at 211-12. In addition, as the terms are used in this Article, "sex stereotyp-
ing" is a colloquial term used to describe a specific application of a cultural idea about
how gender is or should be performed by a person of a given sex, while "gender ide-
ology" is a more encompassing term (defined in more detail below), used to describe
a system of assumptions and assertions about masculinity and femininity which gov-
erns everything from our identities, attitudes and values, to our conduct, practices
and institutions.
10. The term chosen here, "gender ideology" is proposed in part for its lack of stigma and
for its breadth, encompassing more than the concept of sex stereotyping, though the
pervasiveness of sex stereotypes is certainly a component of gender ideology. The
term incorporates both MacKinnon's theory of gender hierarchy as well as the con-
cept of a "gender regime," as articulated in the work of R.W. Connell, a term which
describes the "'organized field of human practice and social relations' through which
women are kept in subordinate positions to men." ANTHONY GIDDENS, SOCIOLOGY
463 (5th ed. 2006) (citing R.W. CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER: SOCIETY, THE PER-
SON AND SEXUAL POLITIcs (1987)). In Connell's gender regime it is understood that
"from the individual to the institutional level, various types of masculinity and femi-
ninity are all arranged around a central premise: the dominance of men over women."
Id.
11. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 108
(1989).
12. See generally Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique, in 14:3 RE-
THINKING MARXISM 49, 49-64 (2002).
116 [Vol. 18:113
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to, and often do, accrue economic, political, and social power-may
challenge the "naturalness" of female subordination. Those women in
turn face punitive consequences (in the form of firings, failures to hire
or promote, unequal pay, harassment, abuse, and so on) for the threat
they pose to the stability of a gender ideology which demands they re-
main subordinate, economically, politically, socially, and otherwise.
Likewise, men occupying traditionally female spheres, or else failing to
adequately perform their gender in traditionally male spheres, also face
punitive consequences on account of this gender ideology, for the way in
which their presence or conduct threatens cultural assumptions about
masculinity and its inevitable dominance.
Understood this way, employers' reliance upon contemporary gen-
der ideology to structure their workplaces undergirds the problem of sex
inequality and has created the need for an interventional statute like Ti-
tle VII, a law which can and should be applied so as to negotiate and
reshape this ideology. But Title VII has not been particularly adept at
doing so, in part because those with the power to interpret the statute
have failed to name gender ideology as sex inequality's culprit, instead
focusing solely on malicious intent and differential treatment by em-
ployers. If gender ideology underpins and explains people's real life
experiences of sex inequality, then it is gender ideology that should be
named as the culprit by those seeking to enforce sex equality. Therefore,
Title VII's legal framework should be recast by courts such that it elicits
a substantive debate in litigation about whether or not an actionable
nexus exists between the plaintiff's harm-his or her particular experi-
ence of injustice at work-and gender ideology." If a plaintiff can show
that the defendant's reliance upon or perpetuation of gender ideology is
13. This Article argues on the premise that, in the face of a contradictory and inconclu-
sive legislative history, courts are at liberty to interpret Title VII in response to
increasingly sophisticated understandings of the meaning of sex discrimination. See,
e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (stating that
despite the fact that "male-on-male sexual harassment ... was assuredly not the prin-
ciple evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII," the Court saw no
justification in the statutory language for a categorical rule excluding same-sex har-
assment claims from the coverage of Title VII, because "statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principle evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed."). This liberty to interpret makes space for courts to consider
the underlying argument supporting this Article: That is, that "gender ideology," as
defined here, and its progeny, "sex stereotyping," are not merely forms of sex discrim-
ination, but rather, constitute the essence of sex inequality.
2011] 117
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the source of his or her workplace harm, plaintiffs claim should be ac-
tionable as a Title VII sex discrimination claim. 4
Part I of this Article situates this argument in the context of com-
peting lines of equality theories and feminisms. While not necessarily
adopting or disavowing any particular strain of feminism, the validity of
the legal framework argued for in this Article depends in large part on
acceptance of the theory of Substantive Equality as articulated in the
work of Catharine MacKinnon. Furthermore, the term "gender ideolo-
gy," as it is used in this Article, is in large part influenced by her
assertion that sex inequality is the product of "gender hierarchy" (a sys-
tem which assumes and reinforces masculine dominance and feminine
subordination)."
Part II analyzes four paradigmatic Title VII sex discrimination cases
in order to demonstrate the general workability of the proposed gender
ideology framework. In addition, this analysis demonstrates that each
instance of discrimination would have been better addressed, for pur-
poses of achieving sex equality, under this alternative framework. And
this is so even when, perhaps especially when, the courts instead applied
their current sameness/difference framework.
Part III proceeds by arguing that it is also gender ideology, and sex
stereotyping in particular, that lies at the heart of the inequality experi-
enced by homosexuals, and to some extent, transsexuals." Critically,
14. The question of whether a defendant's interface with gender ideology should ulti-
mately sustain a finding of discrimination will ultimately hinge on a determination
by the trier of fact that defendant's conduct in perpetuating an aspect of gender ide-
ology is in fact endemic of sex inequality. This is the kind of determination suited for
a trier of fact which has heard arguments from both litigants about whether the sub-
versive nature of gender ideology has been perpetuated by the defendant's conduct.
15. Many litigants and their counsel (including MacKinnon) have already articulated
their claims within a gender ideology framework, and some courts have already ana-
lyzed cases under this same framework. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986). This Article is intended specifically for courts and counsel who
have not adopted this reasoning, in an effort to convince them that a gender ideology
framework can and should be consistently applied to Tide VII sex discrimination
claims.
16. Although this Article argues that creation of a "transsexual" category is problematic
under a gender ideology framework, the debate over why a stereotyping analysis may
or may not be appropriate in the case of discrimination against transsexuals is more
complex than can be addressed here. For a thorough summary of the debate on this
topic, see Chai R. Feldblum, Gay People, Trans People, Women: Is It All About Gen-
der?, 17 N.Y.L. ScH. J. Hum. Rrs. 623 (2000). I only demonstrate here the
applicability of the proposed framework to a few forms of sex discrimination (mainly,
sex discrimination against women in Part II, sex discrimination against homosexuals
in Part Ill, and sex discrimination against men who take paternity leave in Part IV).
These forms are certainly not exhaustive and do not purport to encompass every type
of sex discrimination claim litigated under Tide VII. I encourage more literature to
[Vol. 18:113118
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sexual orientation discrimination must therefore be recognized by courts
as prototypical sex discrimination: discrimination based on a man or
woman's failure to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or
femininity. In advocating for this stereotyping framework to be applied
to sexual orientation discrimination, Part III argues generally against the
multiplication of categories as a method for addressing evolving forms of
discrimination. Specifically, this section argues against the addition of
the category "sexual orientation" to Title VII's list of protected classes,
not because sexual orientation discrimination is not real and should not
be addressed, but because addition of that category perpetuates the
faulty misconception that sexual orientation discrimination is somehow
not about sex stereotyping, is not a form of sex discrimination, and, like
"sex," can also be adequately addressed by mere categorical comparison.
Part III concludes that the addition of a sexual orientation category
problematically allows courts to cling to a surface-level same-
ness/difference discourse in sex equality law (i.e., by asking, "Are
homosexuals treated differently than similarly situated heterosexuals?"),
rather than pursuing a gender ideology analysis which more satisfyingly
describes the experiences of inequality suffered by homosexuals.
Finally, Part IV uses men's experiences of discrimination based on
their decision to take paternity leave to demonstrate how a gender ide-
ology framework more accurately describes and more effectively
vindicates these men's experiences with sex inequality as well.
In sum, in advocating that "gender ideology" provide the legal
framework for Title VII sex discrimination litigation, this Article ulti-
mately posits that a comparative categorical framework should no longer
serve as the courts' central tool of analysis. Instead, a comparative analy-
sis should merely serve as one form of evidentiary proof. This alternative
legal frame, focused on an inquiry into the subjugating effects of gender
ideology, will allow courts to actually unpack the oppressive notions of
masculinity and femininity that underpin sex inequality. It is this project
of gender ideology analysis and criticism that must be engaged in by
courts if equality litigation is to succeed at making more space for men
and women to be less gendered and more fully human, more fully
equal.1 7
be produced responding to how the proposed framework may or may not be worka-
ble in other sex discrimination scenarios not discussed here.
17. As an important aside, I do acknowledge the postmodern concern that there are in-
herent conflicts in addressing problems of gender hierarchy through the law-an
institution whose discourse is itself historically dominated by hetero-normative narra-
tives and a masculine hegemony that remains largely naturalized and
unacknowledged. Yet, as Carol Smart argues, law is nonetheless an integral site of
struggle: "While it is the case that law does not hold the key to unlock patriarchy, it
2011] 119
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I. SUBSTANCE VS. FORM IN TITLE VII
The right to equality in American legal and political discourse is of-
ten described as the right to be treated with "the same consideration as
anyone else,"" with the Kantian notion of the individual as a rights-
bearing entity echoing in the background. Ironically, however, Title VII's
demand that members of certain groups are to be protected from une-
qual treatment on the basis of their membership in that group has
positioned the activity of legal grouping as a central concern in the en-
forcement of equality rights. For example, freedom from sex
discrimination under Title VII is often formally framed as one's right, as
a member of the group woman to be treated the same as a given member
in the group man." The framework is similar for race. In McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, for instance, the Supreme Court held that a
complainant in a Title VII trial establishes a prima facie claim of racial
discrimination "by showing [first] that he belongs to a racial minority
. . .20 In essence, the validity of an individual's claim that she had been
discriminated against was imagined to hinge, first and foremost, on her
ability to establish membership in a given protected class.
The advent of so-called "reverse discrimination" claims forced this
group membership concept to evolve, however.2 1 It has been established,
for example, that a man can make out a prima facie case for "reverse" sex
discrimination if the evidence is sufficient to allow a factfinder to con-
provides the forum for articulating alternative visions and accounts." CAROL SMART,
The Quest for a Feminist jurisprudence, in FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAw 66, 88
(1989). Smart argues that it is the work of feminism to "deconstruct the naturalistic,
gender-blind discourse of law by constantly revealing the context in which it has been
constituted." Id. Tellingly, it is the gender ideology framework proposed here which
disallows gender-blind discourse by forcing litigants to deconstruct a gendered experi-
ence and evaluate the performative power of a given gender ideology to exacerbate sex
inequality. This legal discourse thus becomes unselfconsciously (as opposed to uncon-
sciously or subconsciously) gendered, rendering the courtroom an effective site of
struggle for those narratives-those discourses-that have traditionally been disquali-
fied or silenced by dominant legal dialogue.
18. MAcKINNON, SEx EQuALITY, supra note 6, at 3.
19. See, e.g., Susanne Baer, Dignity or Equality? Responses to Workplace Harrassment in
European, German, and U.S. Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SExuAL HARASSMENT LAw 582,
594 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegal eds., 2004) ("In the United States,
law against sexual harassment has been fought for by women who saw themselves as
targets of discrimination, violated not only in their rights to bodily and psychological
integrity, but in their rights as women . .. and because of their gender.").
20. 411 U.S. 792, 792 (1973).
21. The first "reverse discrimination" claim heard by the Supreme Court arose under
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and the most recent
claim arose under Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Cr. 2658 (2009).
[Vol. 18:113120
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clude that the defendant had treated the plaintiff less favorably based
upon a protected trait (i.e., his sex).22 And the Supreme Court affirmed
in Oncale that "Title VII's prohibition of discrimination 'because of ...
sex' protects men as well as women. 23 1These holdings regarding a man's
right to sex equality echoed the individualist logic of Title VII jurispru-
dence as articulated years earlier in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co. 24 Thus two competing lines of equality theory-one
based on group membership, the other based on individual rights-are
now animating Title VII jurisprudence.2 5
In an attempt to "reconcile" this tension between group rights and
individual rights, courts have overwhelmingly responded with a vacuous
and sterile solution: the similarly situated test. This test asks, as the cen-
tral inquiry in most Title VII disparate treatment sex discrimination
cases, "Has the plaintiff been treated 'differently' than a similarly situat-
ed individual of the opposite sex?" 26 And this inquiry is then
22. See, e.g., ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999).
23. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (quoting
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682
(1983)).
24. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (emphasizing that
Title VII prohibits the discharge of "any individual" and is not limited to discrimina-
tion against any particular group).
25. Tide VII jurisprudence is sometimes crudely described as being conflicted between
two competing theories of equality: Equal Treatment and Equal Opportunity. Equal
treatment theory urges sex blind decision making, focuses on the individual instead of
the group, and seems to discount the possibility of affirmative action. Equal oppor-
tunity theory, with its focus on the status of groups and patterns of subjugation and
underrepresentation, allows for consideration of sex in decision making in order to
remedy past and continuing effects of discrimination. Both have grounding in the
text of Title VII. See ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 5-6 (7th ed. 2004).
26. Circuit courts have demanded a "similarly situated" showing with varying levels of
specificity and at different stages of trial. Some courts, for example, have required the
plaintiff to prove as part of her prima facie case that she was treated differently than
similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected group. See, e.g.,
Goins v. EchoStar Communications Corp., 148 F. App'x. 96, 98 (3d Cir. 2005);
Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1087 (7th Cir. 2000); Rutherford v.
Harris County, 197 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cit. 1999).
Under the Supreme Court's methodology, pointing to a similarly situated em-
ployee the employer treated differently is just one way that a plaintiff may prove a
prima facie case. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358
(1977):
Our decision ... [in McDonnell Douglas] ... did not purport to create an
inflexible formulation. We expressly noted that '(t)he facts necessarily will
vary in Title VII cases, and the specification . . . of the prima facie proof
required from (a plaintiff) is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations.' The importance of McDonnell Douglas lies,
2011] 121
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dogmatically carried out without regard for how or if that treatment has
either emblemized or perpetuated the problem of sex inequality.
Catharine MacKinnon has been particularly critical of the decon-
textualized character of the similarly situated analysis. This Formal
Equality, or "Aristotelian" approach to equality, as she terms it, assumes
as a starting point a structural equality that does not exist, and then pro-
ceeds to reason through discrimination cases using an abstract logic. 27
Formal equality and its "similarly situated" methodology therefore does
not investigate how "difference" is socially perceived through a lens of
gender hierarchy; it does not acknowledge how social rankings are "arti-
facts of social power and location, social constructs that are deeply
arbitrary rather than emanating from anything innate;" and it fails to
recognize that promoting sex equality requires dismantling this socially
constructed gender hierarchy.28 MacKinnon therefore argues instead for
a Substantive Equality which understands sex inequality as a product of
gender hierarchy and historical subjugation, and not "difference." It is
therefore gender hierarchy and not sex difference that must be disman-
tled if sex equality is to be achieved. And so it is gender ideology, and not
some isolated bad actor with some identifiable evil motive, that Title VII
litigation must identify and uproot.
If courts are to engage a substantive and not merely formalistic the-
ory of equality in Title VII litigation, they must apply a legal framework
which resolves the tension between group and individual theories of
equality, and which also allows them to critically evaluate whether a
not in its specification of the discrete elements of proof there required, but
in its recognition of the general principle that any Title VII plaintiff must
carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference
that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal
under the Act." (emphasis added).
Apart from whether a similarly situated showing is required for a plaintiff to es-
tablish a prima facie case, however, the Supreme Court has stated that the "critical
issue" in a Title VII case, "is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvanta-
geous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J. concur-
ring). This "critical issue" has been construed by courts as a question of similarly
situatedness-of whether one sex has been treated differently than the other sex. See,
e.g., infra Part Ild (dicussing Lyle) -which is a simplistic and flawed interpretation of
the concept articulated by Justice Ginsburg. For example, employees can be "exposed"
to differential disadvantage because of sex without being treated "differently" than a
member of the opposite sex. See infra Part Ild (discussing Lyl) and Part le (discuss-
ing Oncale). Furthermore, the "critical question" should be whether any person has
been exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment because of sex,
not whether some have suffered more or less than any other.
27. MAcKINNON, SEx EQAuLTy, supra note 6, at 4-12.
28. MACKINNON, SEx EQuALITy, supra note 6, at 7.
[Vol. 18:113122
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plaintiff's experience is in fact emblematic of sex inequality. The re-
mainder of this Article will test the workability of an alternative legal
framework-a gender ideology framework-that seeks to accomplish
these goals. The framework proposed here inquires not as to whether an
employee is different or has been treated differently than a member of
the opposite sex, but rather, whether she has suffered actionable harm
because of gender ideology. In order to bring an actionable claim, a plain-
tiff must therefore situate her experience and frame the litigation in a
way that is historically and contextually sensitive to the gendered as-
sumptions, stereotypes, and accompanying realities that perpetuate
masculine dominance and female subordination. In sum, this proposed
framework for Title VII litigation requires a new central inquiry: Has
plaintiff shown that gender ideology is the cause of the harm she has
suffered?29 If so, impermissible sex discrimination can be established.
II. RECONCEPTUALIZING TITLE VII's LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Gender Ideology and Sex Stereotyping Under Title VII
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
that Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination disallowed certain em-
ployment decisions to be made on the basis of "gender stereotype."o In
writing for the majority, Justice Brennan famously stated: "As for the
legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an em-
ployer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
29. For a "harm" to be actionable in the Title VII context, it must qualify as a change in
"compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment." See Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(19
6 4 ). Courts
are divided, however, over what constitutes an actionable employment practice. The
most expansive interpretation taken by the First Seventh Ninth and D.C. circuits says
that adverse job action is not limited solely to loss or reduction of pay, but encom-
passes other forms of adversity as well (such as receiving unwarranted negative job
evaluations or being cut off from challenging assignments). The Second and Third
circuits have held that the adverse action must "materially affect" the terms of condi-
tions of employment, while the Fifth and Eight Circuits hold that only "ultimate
employment actions" like hiring, firing, promoting and demoting qualify. Whether a
plaintiff has indeed suffered actionable harm in the Title VII context is not addressed
in this Article, but is positioned as a secondary consideration after the plaintiff has es-
tablished the foundational fact that the harm she suffered was caused by the
perpetuation of gender ideology.
30. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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matched the stereotype associated with their group."3 This statement
seemed to prohibit more than the discrimination suffered by Ann Hop-
kins, whose employer "insisted" that she "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely." It also acknowledged discrimination against those
who are harmed at work because of assumptions made about how a
woman (or a man) stereotypically is in the world. Therefore, a woman
who does not get hired because she walks femininely and talks femininely
may also have a claim under Price Waterhouse.
Sex stereotypes and insistences that employees conform to them are
common, ubiquitous, and paradigmatic of the gender ideology which
works to maintain the status quo of masculine dominance and feminine
subordination. By re-examining four Title VII sex discrimination cases,
the following analyses will demonstrate the value of a judicial inquiry
which focuses on gender ideology, and in so doing, the relative short-
comings of the sameness/difference inquiry the courts used. Had the
courts in these cases applied a gender ideology framework, these sex dis-
crimination claims would have been recognized as such and litigated in
a manner that more effectively evaluates the problem of sex inequality.
B. Manhart
In City of Los Angeles, Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,
women workers brought a Title VII disparate treatment sex discrimina-
tion claim for being required by the City pension plan to contribute
more to the pension fund than men.32 The City defended the require-
ment on the basis that, as a class, women tend to live longer than men.
Holding for plaintiffs, the Court stated that because many women, as
individuals, would not live longer than men, those women were being
unlawfully discriminated against (receiving smaller paychecks) because
of their sex. And, it qualified, "the basic policy of [Title VII] requires
that we focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes.""
The Court acknowledged that "employment decisions cannot be
predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the characteristics of
males or females," but then balks, because in this case, the generalization
31. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 ("In forbidding employers to discriminate against
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.") (quoting
City of Los Angeles, Dep't. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
(1978)).
32. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
33. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709.
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was "unquestionably true: Women, as a class, do live longer than men."
In order to square this tension, the Court concludes that, employers can
only comply with Title VII by being blind to all sex differences, declar-
ing that, "[e]ven a true generalization about the class is an insufficient
reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does
not apply."05
What is not made clear by the Court's opinion, however, is in what
way, precisely, sex inequality was exacerbated by this particular distinc-
tion based on sex or, furthermore, how sex equality was realized by
disallowing it. In contrast to the Manhart majority's sex blind approach,
a gender ideology framework would interrogate these questions by in-
quiring as to whether this employment decision emanated from and/or
propagates a gender ideology which insists on feminine subordination.
Admittedly, this is a difficult foundational inquiry that is both
normative and factual in nature. This inquiry requires the litigants to
engage in a thoughtful debate about whether the "stereotype" that has
been seized upon by the defendant is one that perpetuates a gender ide-
ology of subjugation; it demands a sensitivity to the historical and
cultural context of the institutions and individuals involved in the litiga-
tion; it requires conscious evaluation of the complex interplay between
conduct, thought, ideology and experience; and it ultimately asks the
trier of fact to make the difficult factual determination that a subjugat-
ing ideology has or has not been the cause of plaintiff's harm, such that
the defendant's conduct constitutes discrimination. Nonetheless, it is
this level of substantive inquiry that is required if litigation is to take the
problem of sex inequality seriously-the problem of inequality is, after
all and inescapably, both normative and factual.
In Manhart, it is evident that a pension plan which resulted in re-
duced pay-checks for the plaintiffs would be considered a significant
enough change in the terms of plaintiffs' employment to be actionable
under Title VII if it were proven to have occurred because of sex dis-
crimination." However, it is not obvious under a gender ideology
analysis that the terms of the plan constitute sex discrimination because
the notion that women live longer than men is not clearly a sex stereo-
type that is a bedrock of gender ideology's presumption of male
dominance. To argue this point, one might compare this "stereotype"
about lifespan, seized upon by the Court, to those sex stereotypes that
34. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
35. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 708.
36. See generally, Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986) ("Each week's paycheck
that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable
under Title VII . . .").
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have convincingly been argued to have sprung from a gender ideology
which underpins male supremacy, such as: women are male sexual ob-
jects and servicers; women are weak and docile; women are vehicles of
child bearing and the proper wards of child rearing." In comparison to
these stereotypes, it is not immediately evident how the notion that
"women, as a class, live longer than men" has been informed by gender
ideology, reinforces feminine subordination, or has substantively con-
tributed to the problem of sex inequality. However, this point is
certainly open to debate and should be debated in court, by litigants in a
Title VII case who are engaging substantively with the issue."
In other words, the Manhart decision is deficient not for its out-
come necessarily, but for its process. The Court's discussion in Manhart
fails to interrogate why the specific generalization at issue-that women
live longer than men-is endemic of sex inequality. Instead, the Court
makes the formalistic assertion that any facial distinction based on sex
difference is discriminatory, without ever investigating whether the dis-
tinction actually aggravates the problem of sex inequality. A gender
ideology framework, on the other hand, demands that this inquiry into
the nature and effect of the employer's use of a given sex stereotype be
conducted before concluding that discrimination has occurred. The
Court in Manhart not only missed an opportunity to delve into a sub-
stantive discussion about the causes and manifestations of sex inequality,
but it simultaneously seemed to foreclose the possibility that facial dis-
tinctions based on sex could ever be used to serve, rather than merely
obstruct, the realization of sex equality. A gender ideology framework
avoids this unnecessary result.
37. These are a few examples of "linchpin" issues of sex inequality-prime locations or
original areas of vulnerability driving sex inequality in society. For a more extensive
explanation of linchpin theory, see MACKINNON, SEx EQuALrY, supra note 6, at
142-43.
38. For example, some contend that drawing any line on the basis of sex is invidious
because it problematically reinscribes the salience of sex as a basis for distinction in a
way that is essentalizing. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1., 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Alternatively, one might ar-
gue that the City's facial distinction based on sex impermissibly perpetuates women's
historical disadvantage in the face of the reality that men and women do not "even
out" over the long run (as the City contested), therefore, any reduction in the pay of
women as a class adds impermissible insult to the overarching reality that women are
already economically disadvantaged as compared to men.
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C. Lemons
As this alternative analysis of Manhart demonstrates, a gender ide-
ology framework is sensitive to the reality that seeing sex (i.e., making
facial distinctions based on sex) need not constitute "sex discrimination"
if feminine subordination is not actually reinforced by the distinction.
Accordingly, this framework is also sensitive to the inverse reality that
sometimes it is necessary to see sex in order to address feminine subordi-
nation at all. In other words, sometimes failing to see sex difference is
itself sex discriminatory.
In Lemons v. City ofDenver, the District Court held, and the Appel-
late Court confirmed, that a class of plaintiffs made up of nurses did not
have a Title VII sex discrimination claim despite their contention that
the City of Colorado was paying persons employed in the nursing pro-
fession-a female dominated occupation-less than what persons doing
comparable work in male-dominated occupations were being paid.39 The
court acknowledged that history has created a lower pay scale for certain
"female" occupations, and that women have often been discriminated
against in higher paying occupations. Ultimately, however, the court
concluded that these plaintiffs had not been discriminated against in the
nursing profession itself, "because females outnumber males by a tre-
mendous percentage."40 The court then applied a sameness/difference
framework to conclude that Title VII does not mandate that employers
pay the same salary to "different" professions, even if one is paid more
for no reason other than being stereotypically "male" and one is paid less
for no reason other than being stereotypically "female."41
A gender ideology framework would force courts to proceed
through the Lemons facts differently than did the Colorado court in this
case. Again, the court's central inquiry would be: Has the defendant's
subscription to or perpetuation of gender ideology caused the plaintiff's
harm? In order to answer this question in a case like Lemons, where
plaintiffs exemplify stereotypical generalizations (rather than defy them,
as the plaintiffs did in Manhart), the court must decouple the experi-
enced reality from the so-called "sex stereotype" and then evaluate that
reality in its own right for the extent to which it is governed by gender
39. No. 76-W-1156, 1978 WL 13938, at *1 (D. Colo. 1978).
40. Lemons, 1978 WL 13938, at *5.
41. Lemons, 1978 WL 13938, at *5-7. By logical deduction, the court implies that men
and women would have to be paid the same salaries if they were in the same profes-
sion.
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ideology.42 In other words, gender ideology perpetuates sex stereotypes
and punishes those who fail to conform to them; but in the process,
gender ideology also has the power to inform reality-to coerce individ-
uals into living out those stereotypes (without ever asking whether that
is a life they would otherwise choose).43
With that in mind, the reality exposed in Lemons is that most nurs-
es are women. And the reality is that nurses are paid less than other
professions of comparable worth." And gender ideology-not necessari-
ly nature or the unadulterated logic of economics-has played an
identifiable and integral role in creating that reality: because of its many
assumptions about women, femininity and nurturance, gender ideology
perpetuates the stereotype that "care work," like nursing, is work that
women innately can and want to do (even though it is paid less or noth-
ing at all)." In effect, commonly stereotyped as natural caregivers,
women have found their greatest (sometimes only) opportunities to find
work in "care giving" jobs. Those jobs involving care work, such as child
care, teaching, therapy, and nursing, in turn offer low pay relative to
42. The Supreme Court has, arguably, already evidenced its ability to decouple stereo-
types from reality and evaluate whether the defendant has relied on the gender
ideology in a way that exacerbates sex inequality. In Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313 (1977), an Equal Protection case, a social security provision allowed female wage
earners to exclude from the computation of their average monthly wages three more
lower-earning years than male wage earners. The Court explained that this (affirma-
tive action-like) sex distinction was not motivated by a gender ideology or a
stereotype about women-that it was not "the accidental byproduct of a traditional
way of thinking about females"-but rather, that it was enacted to compensate for
the "disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long
history of discrimination against women." Califano, 430 U.S. at 320. The Court was
able to decouple the reality (women have made less than men) from the Plaintiffs
proposed "sex stereotype" (women cannot support themselves) and held that the dis-
tinction was not discriminatory. The Court was convinced that ignoring this reality
would, in fact, exacerbate sex equality.
43. Postmodern feminists have critiqued the liberalist insistence that an individual is
somehow above ideology, that she truly wields the capacity to make untethered
choices and exercise complete agency over her identity and opportunities. Susan Bor-
do, for example, argues that this understanding unrealistically reproduces "a
construction of life as plastic possibility and weightless choice, undetermined by his-
tory, social locations, or even individual biography." Susan Bordo, Material Girl: The
Effacements ofPostmodern Culture, 29 MIcH. Q. REv. 653, 657 (1990).
44. The Lemons court makes this finding definitively, though it declined to rule in favor
of the plaintiffs. 1978 WL 13938 (finding that male-dominated occupations pay
more for comparable work than is paid in the occupations dominated by females). See
also, ELAINE SORENSEN, COMPARABLE WORTH: IS IT A WORTHY POLIcY? 3, 7, 9
(1994).
45. For a historical perspective on this topic, see Reva B. Siegal, Home as Work: The First
Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 130 YAU L.
J. 1073, 1079 (1994).
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their requirements for education and skill.46 Thus the gendered division
of labor, and the economic inequality that exists between the sexes, have
both been convincingly argued to be intimately linked to gender ideolo-
gy: this sex stereotype-about women, their femininity, and their inher-
inherent care-giving affinity-has resulted in fewer opportunities being
afforded to women to work in areas outside of the economy of care, as
well as the economic undervaluation of the care work they do."7 And so
(arguably) it is the City's perpetuation of gender ideology that has
caused the distinct harm of lower pay for equal work that was endured
by these plaintiffs.
As this analysis demonstrates, within a gender ideology framework
plaintiffs are at liberty to identify the operative elements of gender ide-
ology-its sex stereotypes and problematic assumptions-and then
argue for the way in which the defendant's dependence upon, or perpet-
uation of that ideology has caused the plaintiffs' particular harm. The
above line of reasoning shows that there is a potentially actionable nexus
in Lemons between gender ideology, the City's actions, and the plaintiffs'
harm. However, it must be acknowledged that this argument is difficult
to articulate in a manner that will convince the trier of fact that an ide-
ology-and not merely some isolated "bad actor" alone-is the legal
cause of these plaintiffs' lower paychecks. And furthermore, as the Lem-
ons opinion evidences, it is difficult to convince the trier of fact that the
City should be held liable for institutionalizing that ideology." But at
the very least, this argument does not fall flat simply because it does not
fit within the sameness/difference framework (where "different work"
can always be paid less without violating equality law). At the very least,
46. See Paula England & Nancy Folbre, The Cost of Caring, 561 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 39, 39 (1999).
47. Cross-cultural studies support that in almost all cultures, women and men do differ-
ent work, although what women do in one culture men often do in another. Yet
whatever it is that men do in a culture is what is most valued. This supports the ar-
gument that there is an unconscious undervaluation of any work done by women.
See, e.g., Sherry B. Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?, in WOMAN,
CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 67 (Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo & Louise Lamphere eds.,
1974); Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" ofSex, in
TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157, 178 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975).
48. See Lemons, 1978 WL 13938 (positing that Title VII was not intended to "abrogate
the laws of supply and demand," that what plaintffs sought was an "unrealistic" re-
structuring of the economy, and so finding for the City in light of the fact that its
wage system "was set up in absolute good faith"). In response to this reservation,
however, it bears reminding the trier of fact that Tide VII was engineered with the
unambiguous intention of holding employers responsible for the larger social problem
of inequality where their policies and practices worked to perpetuate it, even if they
are not exclusively to "blame" for it.
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in escaping the confines of the sameness/difference framework, this gen-
der ideology framework promises to elicit an important substantive
debate, in a public legal forum, about whether and how certain gen-
dered assumptions embedded in our economy in fact perpetuate sex
inequality, and whether Title VII can and should be used to address
them.
D. Lyle
Inquiry into the role gender ideology, and in particular, "sex stereo-
typing," plays in a Title VII sex discrimination claim becomes
particularly applicable to hostile environment sexual harassment cases
because it provides a satisfying answer to the pivotal doctrinal question:
Has the harassment occurred "because of sex?"49 In Lyle v. Warner Bros.
Television Productions,50 the plaintiff brought a sex harassment claim
against the television studio where she worked." Plaintiff testified to the
following regarding her experiences with the writing staff while she was
at work:
The writers regularly discussed their preferences in women and
sex in general. Chase spoke of his preferences for blonde wom-
en, a certain bra cup size, "getting right to sex" and not
"messing around with too much foreplay." Malins had a love
of young girls and cheerleaders ... Malins constantly spoke of
his oral sex experiences ... Malins had a 'coloring book' de-
picting female cheerleaders with their legs spread open; he
would draw breasts and vaginas on the cheerleaders during the
writers' meetings ... Malins frequently used a pencil to alter
portions of the name 'Fiends' on scripts so it would read 'pe-
nis' . . . Chase, Malins, and Reich spoke demeaningly about
another actress on the show, making jokes about whether she
was competent in sexually servicing her boyfriend. They also
49. Generally speaking, in order to make out a hostile work environment claim under
Title VII, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that she was subjected to harass-
ment "because of sex," that was "unwelcome" and "severe or pervasive" enough to
affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
50. 132 P.3d 211 (Cal. 2006).
51. California's FEHA statute essentially mirrors Title VII's prohibition on sexual har-
assment, which prohibits sexual harassment on the basis that it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, term, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's sex[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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referred to her infertility once and joked she had 'dried twigs'
or 'dried branches in her vagina.52
Despite the lewdness of defendants' behavior, the court held that
there was no triable issue as to whether the writers had engaged in har-
assment "because of . . . sex" because: 1) they had not intended their
sexual antics and sexual talk to make plaintiff uncomfortable, and 2)
women and men were not treated disparately in this environment." In
other words, women and men were "equally" exposed to the writer's
sexual "humor" and so there was no discrimination "because of sex."
This lack of facial distinction of treatment on the basis of sex-so
integral to the Lyle court-is essentially irrelevant in a gender ideology
analysis. In a case like Lyle, the court would instead inquire as to wheth-
er the harassment endured by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's
dependence upon or perpetuation of gender ideology. There is a great
deal of literature that would argue vehemently that the sexual objectifi-
cation of women is a bedrock of a gender ideology which seeks to
maintain female subordination-sexually and otherwise." Gender
52. More specifically (and graphically), plaintiffs declarations stated that Malins, Chase,
and Reich, "would say that what they liked was 'a woman with big tits who could
give a blow job;' " the writers "would for hours on end make lewd and offensive
drawings of women;" they "would also commonly sit around and bang their hands
on the bottom of the desk to make it sound as though they were masturbating;" Ma-
lins would say "he gets to hang out with them [two of the actresses], get rich, dream
about fucking them and yet nobody bothers him when he's out in public;" Malins
told a story "about a woman that when she had his penis down her throat had a gag
reflex" and Malins thought she "was going to throw-up" on it; the writers made
plaintiff sit "around waiting to go home" while they "were sitting around pretending
to masturbate and continually talking about schlongs;" Reich "said that [one ac-
tress's] pussy was full of dried up twigs and said that if her husband put his dick in
her she'd break in two;" Chase told plaintiff "he could have 'fucked' one of the ac-
tresses" but said it's "'not like she asked me to bang her in the ass;'" Chase
mentioned on at least two occasions that "he would have liked to have anal sex with
[the same actress];" Chase "once rhetorically asked the group, of [one actress and her
then boyfriend], 'do you think they fuck in the dressing room;' " and the "blatant use
of obscene language and flagrant discussions about personal sex lives occurred at least
four days per week while [she] worked on 'Friends' and continued up until at least
two days before [her] termination." 132 P.3d at 217-19.
53. See 132 P.3d at 229.
54. See 132 P.3d at 229.
55. See, e.g., ANDREA DwoRKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 3, 130 (1989) ("Sexuality is the social
process through which social relations of gender are created. . . . Dominance eroti-
cized defines the imperatives of its masculinity, submission eroticized defines its
femininity . . . . Being a thing for sexual use is fundamental to it."); Susan T. Fiske &
Peter Glick, Ambivalence and Stereotypes Cause Sexual Harassment: A Theory with Im-
plications for Organizational Change, 97 J. Soc. ISSUES 97 (1995) (theorizing that
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ideology informed these writers' tendency to incessantly allude to the
sexual penetration and domination of the female body-conduct which
reaffirmed their masculinity." Their perpetuation of gender ideology
created a workplace environment wherein men and masculinity domi-
nated, and where the plaintiff was constantly reminded of her
subordinate "nature" as, ultimately and only, a sexual object. Whether
the plaintiff suffered an actionable harm is a different factual question
altogether, related to the separate doctrinal question of "severity or per-
vasiveness"-an issue not addressed in this Article." But the genesis of
plaintiff's alleged harm was clearly gender ideology.
This argument would likely be countered by the Defendant em-
ployer's insistence that this sexual banter was a product of harmless male
bonding, primal and natural libido, and lust, and not of some socially
constructed (or changeable) gender ideology. Kerry Segrave, in a pointed
rebuttal to that assertion, argues:
Sexual harassment has nothing whatsoever to do with libido
and lust. It has everything to do with exploiting, objectifying
and dominating women. It is a manifestation of the extreme
loathing many men bear toward women .... Linking sexual
harassment with libido lays the groundwork for excusing, ac-
cepting and forgiving male violence against women. If sexual
harassment is libido, then men cannot help it . . . . If it is libi-
do, then nature is the culprit, and what can be done about
nature?"
Regardless of whether the trier of fact accepts the plaintiff's argument or
sides with the defendant, within a gender ideology framework the legal
sexual harassment results from complex interplay of sexist motives of paternalism,
gender differentiation, and heterosexuality with stereotyped images of women and
jobs along the same lines).
56. In one study, for example, 20 percent of men said they harassed women only in the
company of men friends, indicating that sexual harassment of women operates at
least at some level, as a method of male bonding, providing a common ground over
which men can, together, assert and reaffirm their masculinity. See Cheryl Benard &
Edit Schlaffer, The Man in the Street: Why He Harasses, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS
70, 71 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds., 2d ed. 1984).
57. Whether a plaintiff has suffered actionable harm in the sexual harassment context is
to be determined under the "severe or pervasive" standard of Title VII. After deter-
mining that the harassment was not "because of sex" since men and women were
equally exposed to the banter, the court in Lyle determined that the behavior of the
writers was also not severe or pervasive. 132 P.3d at 287-95. This is a separate doc-
trinal question not addressed in this Article.
58. KERRY SEGRAVE, THE SEXuAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, 1600
TO 1993, at 2 (1994).
(Vol. 18:113132
SEX EQUALITY'S UNNAMED NEMESIS
and factual debate presented by the case would not focus, as the court
did in Lyle, on whether men were also exposed to the "humor" to which
the plaintiff was exposed. That comparative question becomes irrelevant
to making the determination of whether the defendant's dependence
upon and perpetuation of gender ideology has caused the plaintiff's
harm.
E. Oncale
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offihore Services, Inc., Joseph Oncale was
employed on an oil rig with an eight-man crew where he was repeatedly
physically assaulted in a sexual manner, subjected to sex-related, humili-
ating actions, and threatened with rape." These incidents were the basis
of his hostile environment sexual harassment claim. Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority, held that, "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a
claim of discrimination 'because of . .. sex' merely because the plaintiff
and the defendant are of the same sex."o The Court further stated that
on remand in this case and in others that may come to follow, same sex
sexual harassment could be shown to be "because of sex," if (for exam-
ple) the harassers on board were gay and motivated by sexual desire; if
the men on board were generally hostile to men in their workplace; or if
there was comparative evidence plaintiff could show about how the al-
leged harassers treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex
workplace." Ironically, it is not likely that any of these hypothetical
frameworks offered by the Court would actually have served to vindicate
Joseph Oncale's sexual harassment claim if that case had been heard on
remand.62 A gender ideology analysis, however, would very likely reveal
how and why Oncale's experience is a clear example of discrimination,
caused by (or endured "because of") his sex.
A gender ideology framework would address the "because of sex"
question by inquiring into the connection between the harm Oncale
suffered and the role of gender ideology in the defendant's conduct. This
59. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
60. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79. The Court wrote in Oncale not to come to a judgment on the
merits of the case, but rather, only to make clear that same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII; the case was remanded to the court below for a judgment
on the merits. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 89.
61. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
62. Oncale did not argue that a) his harassers were gay and motivated by sexual desire
(they were presumably straight); b) that they were hostile to men in the workplace
generally (not all men were subject to this kind of harassment); or c) that women and
men were treated differently on the oil rig (there in fact were no women on board).
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inquiry is particularly important in the context of male-on-male sex
harassment claims, where the nexus between the plaintiff's harm and sex
inequality is more attenuated in the cultural imagination than it is, say,
in a case like Lyle. The following line of argument highlights just one
way that Oncale might have established that the harassment and abuse
he suffered at the hands of his coworkers was caused by gender ideology.
The narrative not brought to light in the Oncale decision is that Jo-
seph Oncale was one of the smallest, youngest men on the oil rig. He
had a very small stature, standing only five feet tall and weighing about
125 pounds.63 All of the harassment he suffered was highly sexualized, if
not, evidently, feminizing. 4 Toni Lester, for one, posits that Oncale was
harassed because he was a man who failed to conform to cultural stereo-
61
types about how men are supposed to act and look in our society.
Oncale's coworkers were policing stereotypical masculine norms, and
Oncale was punished for the threat his failure to conform posed to those
norms. In other words, if he was not a masculine man, he would not be
allowed to walk around that oil rig as a man at all, and so he was tireless-
ly feminized, reminding everyone aboard, again and again, that he was
not a "real man." Oncale's physical appearance challenged an ideology
which seeks to reinscribe the naturalness of the coincidence between the
male sex and stereotypical masculinity. Oncale's coworkers, in turn,
sought to discipline him for his undermining of gender ideology's tenets.
This harassment was, therefore, prototypical sex discrimination. As
Katharine Franke explains it,
sexual harassment is a kind of sex discrimination not because
the conduct would not have been undertaken if the victim had
been a different sex, not because it is sexual and not because
men do it to women, but precisely because it is a technology
of sexism. That is, it perpetuates, enforces and polices a set of
gender norms that seek to feminize women and masculinize
66men.
In other words, the harassment endured by Oncale was sex discrimina-
tion because it occurred as a result of a gender ideology which demands
the enforcement of masculine dominance and gender/sex coincidence:
63. Brief for National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc., et al., "Support-
ing Petitioner" (No. 96-569), 1997 WL 471814, at *9 (1998).
64. Id.; see also, TONI P. LESTER, GENDER, NONCONFORMITY, RACE, AND SEXUALITY:
CHARTING THE CONNECTIONS 91 (2002).
65. Id.
66. Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691
(1997).
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Oncale was subordinated and abused by his coworkers, the mouthpieces
of gender ideology in this case, on account of his departure from norma-
tive conceptions of masculinity. The court's inability to make categorical
comparisons based on sex is therefore not pivotal for answering the
question of whether sex discrimination occurred in this case-no wom-
en needed to be on board Oncale's oil rig for the problem of sex
inequality to be exacerbated by the normative demands of gender ideol-
ogy.
III. THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLYING CATEGORIES
A. An Argument Against the Addition of "Sexual Orientation" to
Title VII's List ofProtected Classes
Judicial insistence on the centrality of a sameness/difference analy-
sis to resolving questions of impermissible discrimination has
incentivized persons to organize their claims around their group identity
in order to have their rights vindicated. Plaintiffs, forced to argue that
they have been treated differently as members of a given protected group
(even though they are "the same" as any person in any other group),
have thus created a kind of "politics of identity",6 surrounding U.S.
equality law. The Gay Rights movement provides a prime example of
how identity politics have developed in response to the growing salience
of legal categorization in anti-discrimination law.
Mainstream political movements for gay rights in the U.S. have ad-
dressed the lack of legal protections for homosexuals by "attempting to
,,68meet the requirements of various legal doctrines on their own terms;
that is, by insisting that because of an essential lack of difference be-
tween homosexuals and heterosexuals, one's membership in the group
"homosexual" cannot, under a system of equality, disentitle her to rights
to which she would otherwise be entitled. The debate surrounding
67. Identity politics is defined in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, as a phrase
which "has come to signify a wide range of political activity and theorizing founded
in the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain social groups. Rather than
organizing solely around belief systems . . . identity political formations typically aim
to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger
context. Members of that constituency assert or reclaim ways of understanding their
distinctiveness that challenge dominant oppressive characterizations, with the goal of
greater self-determination." Identity Politics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY available at http://plato.stanford.edulentrieslidentity-politics/ (updated Nov. 2,
2007).
68. MACKINNON, SEx EQUALYTY, supra note 6, at 978.
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whether or not to include the category "sexual orientation" in Title VII's
explicit protections highlights the broader problem which is being en-
gaged in this Article: that is, the problem of understanding inequality in
strictly categorical and comparative terms rather than as a product of
gender ideology.
To begin with, it must be acknowledged that there is a strong ra-
tionale for adding sexual orientation to a list of statutorily protected
classes in light of the axiomatic truth that that which is not named cannot
be addressed.9 In other words, by failing to name sexual orientation as a
basis for discrimination in a broad call for equality, there exists the dan-
ger that the disadvantage incurred by homosexuals will not be addressed
at all and that the specificities of their discrete experiences will be si-
lenced and rendered invisible. Additionally, if in reality, recognition of a
certain group is tied to allocation of rights, resources, or obligations, a
withholding of recognition may not only be considered a failure of the
legal system to offer recourse to that group, but is an act of discrimina-
tion itself.70
Moreover, law-when understood as an institution engaged in the
production of "political knowledge"-has the discursive power to frame,
form, and in Foucault's terminology, "govern" identities, relationships,
and material experiences of inequality." Legal decision making about
which forms of discrimination should be recognized thus occupies an
. .. *72
important space in an important moment within inequality discourse.
In naming sexual orientation an impermissible basis of distinction, the
law sends a message to homosexuals that their voices have been heard,
their experiences have been recognized, and their equality has been pri-
oritized; it politicizes discrimination against homosexuals by calling it a
public wrong and not merely a private conviction; it denaturalizes cer-
tain discriminatory cultural impulses and assumptions about
homosexuality and deems them socially constructed and changeable.
And in enabling legal recourse, this naming provides more people with
69. Catharine MacKinnon, Lecture during Sex Equality at University of Michigan Law
School (March 16, 2009).
70. European Commission, Measuring Discrimination: Data Collection and EU Equality
Law 76 (Nov. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Measuring Discrimination]; see also Vriend v. Al-
berta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.)("[T]he omission [itselfJ ... creates a distinction.
That distinction results in a denial of the equal benefit and equal protection of the
law.").
71. Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique, in 14 RETHINKING MARX-
ism 49, 54-55 (2002).
72. See id. at 55 ("Discourse" in the Foucaultian sense, as a process of "producing new
forms of knowledge, inventing different notions and concepts that contribute to the
'government' of new domains of regulation and intervention.").
[Vol. 18:113136
SEX EQUALITY'S UNNAMED NEMESIS
more political currency and social capital to combat their personal expe-
riences of inequality in a public forum.
On the other hand, creating a legal class of "homosexuals," like cre-
ating a class of "women" or "racial minorities," can be problematic in
practice. First, class categorization itself is inescapably essentialist, as it is
perhaps incapable of doing justice to the diverse experiences of the indi-
viduals it seeks to round up and describe. The European Commission's
project on Measuring Discrimination highlights in its report the inher-
ent inability of categories to capture the dynamic of human identity. It
observes,
the reality that hides behind facially simple concepts such as
... 'sexual orientation' is characterized by deeper and wider
diversity than the essentialist use of these terms in legal texts or
everyday speech would lead one to expect. Thus there are no
tight fits between concepts and categories on the one hand and
the empirical reality on the other.73
Nonetheless, as the report itself concedes, a pragmatic approach to tack-
ling issues of discrimination means that certain compromises may need
to be made during the process of categorization in order to address the
problem at all."
73. Measuring Discrimination, supra note 70, at 80-8 1.
74. See Measuring Discrimination, supra note 70, at 81. These compromises must also be
made in order to accept a gender ideology approach to the problem of sex inequality.
The gender ideology framework proposed here demands that sex discrimination
claimants establish a nexus between gender ideology and the harm they have suffered
at work. Therefore, the shared experiences of discrimination against classes of people
must inevitably be discussed in court. How, for example, can one make a claim that a
sex stereotype has caused harm without discussing the ideas society has about distinct
groups of people, i.e., men and women? This framework is therefore admittedly es-
sentializing in that it reifies the category "sex" (and in this section, the category
"sexual orientation") by using that category as a reference point for organizing legal
arguments. This framework does not assume, however, that just because categories,
such as sex, sexual orientation, etc., are currently significant organizers of human ex-
perience, experienced in real ways by real people, that they are not also socially
constructed and changeable. For example, in regards to the sexual orientation catego-
ty, George Chauncey argues that hetero-homosexual binarism is a "stunningly recent
creation. ... Only in the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's did the now-conventional divi-
sion of men into 'homosexuals' and 'hetereosexuals,' based on the sex of their sexual
partners, replace the division of men into 'fairies' and 'normal men' on the basis of
their imaginary gender status as the hegemonic way of understanding sexuality."
GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORIC GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING
OF THE GAY MALE WORLD 1890-1940, at 13 (1994). Within the proposed gender
ideology framework, categories are being used as a discussion point, yes, but they are
also being scrutinized in an attempt to denaturalize them and to show how their
2011] 137
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Thus, perhaps a stronger argument against the formation of a "sex-
ual orientation" category within Title VII is not a criticism of
categorization in the abstract, but a criticism focused on the effects of
creating such a legal classification. One particularly problematic effect is
the way in which a sexual orientation category may serve to obscure the
content and meaning of the category that already is named in Title VII,
namely, "sex." As mentioned supra in Part 1, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that Title VII's prohibition on
sex discrimination disallowed certain employment decisions to be made
on the basis of "gender stereotype," stating that, "we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group.",7 Later, in
Oncale, the Court again reaffirmed its understanding that sex and gen-
der are separate concepts when it declared that gender harassment is not
necessarily sexual and thus may be actionable as sex discrimination re-
gardless of the sex of the parties involved.7 ' The natural progression of
this more sophisticated understanding of gender as a social construct
would seem to result in recognition by the courts that those harms
which plaintiffs endure because of normative conceptions of gender per-
formance clearly are "because of" sex. But lower U.S. courts have failed
to make this conceptual leap in full, perhaps because should that leap be
made, all discrimination on the basis of homosexuality (an inherently
nontraditional performance of masculinity or femininity)77 would be
actionable under Title VII. Instead, sexual orientation discrimination
has been cast as an essentially different "issue" than sex discrimina-
tion 7"-one is about homosexuals, the other about women.
unquestioned stability has perpetuated inequality. And within a Title VII framework
where gender ideology is the main tool for analysis of sex discrimination claims, a
plaintiffs claim may be vindicated regardless of his membership in a given category,
and more importantly, regardless of whether that category describes his reality (see
supra Part II) or fails to encompass it (compare supra Part II.B). This framework
thus discusses categories in an effort to destabilize them.
75. 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
76. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc, 523 U.S. 75, 79-81 (1998).
77. See MAcKINNON, SEx EQuALiTY, supra note 6, at 1068-69 ("When perceived and
punished as gay men and lesbian women, they are discriminated against for flouting
gender hierarchy, for failing to conform to male-dominant society's requirements for
women and femininity, men and masculinity.").
78. See, e.g., Carreno v. Local Union No. 226, No. 89-4083-S, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13817, at *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1990) (finding harassment based on sexual prefer-
ence not sex not actionable under Title VII); cf Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33
(2d Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination per se).
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What this category-driven approach misses, however, is an under-
standing that sex discrimination is not essentially about women, and
sexual orientation discrimination is not essentially about homosexuals;
rather, both forms of discrimination are a manifestation of the hierarchy
of masculinity over femininity and society's insistence on normative
gender performance in order to maintain it.79 As Hilary Charlesworth
observes, "[r]eading gender to be essentially about women does not cap-
ture the relational nature of gender, the role of power relations, and the
way that structures of subordination are reproduced.""0 Instead, discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation can be explained, at least in
part, by the threat same-sex sexual relationships pose to the "naturalness"
of gender roles in that hierarchy. As MacKinnon explains:
Male inviolability and female violation are cardinal tenets of
gender hierarchy. If men can do to men what men do to wom-
en sexually, women's sexual place as man's inferior is not a giv-
given, natural one, because a biological male can occupy it.8'
Failure to recognize-legally and otherwise-this connection between
sex inequality and sexual orientation discrimination may be a fatal mis-
take in combating both problems: such a failure reveals a fundamental
misunderstanding of the way in which gender ideology disciplines how
we identify ourselves and relate to one another, and how gender ideolo-
gy governs our experiences of injustice and inequality.8 2 Therefore, if we
find it necessary to add the category of "sexual orientation" as a protect-
ed class under Title VII, we risk losing sight of the fact that gender
ideology is the common source of homosexuals' and women's experiences
of inequality. To conceive of these experiences of inequality as
79. See MAcKINNON, SEx EQUALITY, supra note 6, at 1068.
80. Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waiving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human
Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARv. Hum. RTs. J. 1, 15 (2005).
81. MAcKINNON, SEx EQUALITY, supra note 6, at 1068.
82. John Stoltenberg takes a stance against the concept of "sexual orientation" altogether,
arguing in the process that "[c]linging to 'sex difference' is clinging to male suprema-
cy. And our 'sexual orientation' is one of the ways we've learned to cling....
Insistence on having a sexual orientation in sex is about defending the status quo,
maintaining sex differences and sexual hierarchy." JOHN STOLTENBERG, What is
"Good Sex'?, in REFUSING TO BE A MAN: ESSAYS ON SOCIAL JUSTICE 89, 93 (UCL
Press rev. ed. 2000) (1989). In other words, for so long as we exist within a gender
ideology whereby heterosexuality defines men's masculinity, "sexual orientation" ex-
ists to discipline the gender performance of one's sex. Therefore, the category of
sexual orientation "actually and ultimately is sex-based." Francisco Valdes, Queers,
Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and
"Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 336
(1995).
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symptomatic of different cultural anxieties is to misunderstand both; to
pull them together under one conceptual and legal framework is to
more effectively combat them by targeting their common nemesis.
Not only is the proposed gender ideology framework wide enough
to address discrimination against both women as a group and homosex-
uals as a group, it is in fact essential to combating these forms of
inequality." It follows, then, that in order for a statute like Title VII to
address what it purports to address-sex equality in the workplace-
litigation surrounding this Act must focus not on whether a given
individual falls into a protected class and has been treated differently
because of his or her or membership in that class, but rather, on whether
a complainant is suffering due to gender ideology's enforcement of its
vision of gender normativity. And although the U.S. has yet to attempt
formally this sort of a legal recasting, other countries have begun to
loosen the hold of the dominant categorical discourse by incorporating
elements of a gender ideology framework into the law and policy sur-
rounding governmental enforcement of equality.
B. The EUS Application ofa Gender Ideology Framework
The EU took a progressive step in recognizing sex inequality as a
product of gender ideology when the European Parliament issued a Di-
rective on "the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities
and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and
occupation." The Directive stated:
[T]he scope of the principle of equal treatment for men and
women cannot be confined to the prohibition of discrimina-
tion based on the fact that a person is of one or other sex. In
view of its purpose and the nature of the rights which it seeks
to safeguard, it also applies to discrimination arising from the
14
gender reassignment of a person.
The Directive was passed in recognition of the discrete experience of
inequality endured by transsexuals at work. Yet, instead of creating a
new legal category of "transsexuals" as a protected class, the Directive
83. See Valdes, supra note 82, at 324 ("[G]ender is the central device for the simultaneous
oppression both of women and of sexual minorities under hetero-patriarchy.").
84. Council Directive 2005/54 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July
2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treat-
ment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), 2006
O.J. (L 204) 23, 23 (EC).
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conceptualized discrimination against transsexual individuals as a matter
of sex discrimination.
The U.S., on the other hand, has not yet recognized a protection
under Title VII for transsexuals as such, though it has struggled within
its categorical framework to determine whether the discrimination they
incur is a form of sex discrimination. In Doe v. United Consumer Finan-
cial Services,"' the court reasoned that a transsexual woman who failed to
"pass" as a biological women was fired for one of two reasons: either 1)
because she was a transsexual, in which case her claim is precluded un-
der Title VII, or 2) because her appearance and behavior did not
conform to the employer's gender expectations, in which case she would
have a valid sex discrimination claim under Title VII. Perhaps because
the term "transsexual" (much like the term "homosexual") has become
so salient and familiar that it is imagined to describe a distinct "class" of
persons, this court was unable to recognize that discrimination against
transsexuals might nonetheless still stem from sex discrimination itself,
and not some new form of "transsexual discrimination."
Just as has been true for homosexuals, who have sought recognition
for "sexual orientation" as a legal category deserving of equality law pro-
tections, this kind of constrained legal reasoning compels transsexuals to
seek legal recognition and protection not merely as men or women but
as transmen and transwomen," so that they might have access to
government enforcement of equal treatment." The multiplication of
these categories-demanded by courts and produced by identity
politics-permits courts to continue to conceive of "sex discrimination,"
"sexuality discrimination" and "gender identity discrimination" as mat-
ters of dissimilar treatment of different "classes" rather than as
manifestations of gender ideology.
A gender ideology approach to sex discrimination recognizes that
because sex inequality is dependent upon an ideology which enforces the
dominance of masculinity over femininity (and only incidentally, men
over women) it imposes punitive consequences on those who destabilize
its naturalness and inevitability, namely, transsexuals and homosexuals.
The EU has already demonstrated the tenability of framing discrimina-
tion on the basis of "gender reassignment" or transsexuality as a question
85. Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01-CV-1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *5
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001).
86. See MACKINNON, SEX EQUALiTY, supra note 6, at 175-76.
87. Steven Whittle, Transgender Rights: The European Court of Human Rights and New
Identity Politics for a New Age, in A HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CEN-
TURY, 201 (Angela Hegarty & Siobhan Leonard eds., Cavendish Publishing Limited,
1999).
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of sex equality. So too can U.S. courts make this conceptual leap, legally
construing sexual orientation discrimination to be both source and
symptom of sex inequality, and therefore, as an instance of sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII. This recasting performs the crucial job of
challenging the stability of gender and sex as inextricably entwined bed-
fellows, and in the process, creates space for more claims against gender
policing-the true nemesis of sex equality-to be brought and won.
IV. MALE CARETAKERS AND GENDER IDEOLOGY
If the proposed framework is to illuminate how gender ideology
manifests itself in people's experiences of sex inequality at work, it must
not hypocritically imagine itself to be limited to those "classes" of people
thought to represent the underprivileged. Otherwise, this proposal
would both revivify the categories it seeks to destabilize and fail to ad-
dress the tension between the group-based and individualist theories of
equality that it claims to reconcile. Therefore, the argument that sex in-
equality is in fact maintained by gender ideology's insistence on strict
gender performance must acknowledge that all individuals-even
wealthy, white, heterosexual men-could make out valid sex discrimina-
tion claims that also serve to combat sex inequality.
Not surprisingly, because Title VII's current legal framework focus-
es predominantly on whether or not women and men are being treated
differently in the workplace, the men who have seen the most success in
bringing sex discrimination claims have presented themselves as victims
of reverse-discrimination." Male plaintiffs have typically argued that an
employer provided women with "preferential treatment" by taking sex
into account in making an employment decision."o Because the alterna-
tive framework proposed here focuses not on comparisons between men
and women but rather on whether or not the alleged harm has been
caused by gender ideology, most of these reverse-discrimination claims
should fail: the "harm" suffered by these men is caused by the employer's
attempt to reverse the subordinating effects of gender ideology, not by its
uncritical perpetuation of gender ideology." In fact, many of these re-
88. Note, however, that the EU has recognized sexual orientation discrimination on its
own terms, and not as a matter of sex discrimination.
89. See supra note 21.
90. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642 (1987).
91. This assertion is in tension with the familiar argument that any distinction based on
sex is impermissible sex discrimination. This Article criticizes that position as an ab-
straction that has no substantive relevance to equality, in light of the fact that we do
not operate in a world where all other things considered, men and women are sub-
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verse discrimination claims ironically perpetuate the harms and injustic-
es created by gender ideology and sex inequality. Under a gender
ideology approach, the claims more likely to succeed would be those
made by a man-no matter his race or sexuality-who has suffered pu-
nitive consequences in the workplace because of his failure to live up to
strict norms of masculinity.
As was mentioned supra in Part II's discussion of Lemons, much of
the discrimination women in particular have suffered in the American
workplace has been tied to gendered notions of care.92 Whether this dis-
crimination be due to pregnancy (or potential pregnancy), "conflicting"
family responsibilities, or general assumptions about women's natural
domesticity, the gendered economy of care has rendered many working
women, in the eyes of the courts, not "similarly situated" to their male
counterparts." As new generations take to the American workplace,
however, new notions about the relationship between work and family,
and sex roles within those institutions, are being negotiated. The U.S.
Congress has responded to this evolution by passing the Family and
Medical Leave Act, a non-gender specific protection for those taking
leave to care for family members. The Act was passed with the purport-
ed goal of reassuring workers that they will not be asked to choose
between continuing their employment and meeting their personal and
94
family obligations. Even major American law firms have provided a
number of weeks of paid leave for new fathers, a benefit which has in
fact been utilized by the applicable workforce." This trend suggests that
there may be a shift of meaning from an overwhelmingly female-
gendered ethic of care towards a more gender-neutral concept of whose
job it is to do the work of caring.
stantively equal. This argument is, again, informed by MacKinnon's theory of sub-
stantive equality. See MACKINNON, SEx EQUALiTY, supra note 6, at 282 ("If gender
inequality is fundamentally abstract, any sex-based distinction . . . reinforces that sys-
tem to women's detriment. . . . Alternatively, if gender inequality is fundamentally
substantive-is about keeping women down-official sex distinctions that rectify and
compensate for women's second-class status may change it.").
92. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAmILY 56 (enl. ed. 1991) ("[T]he house-
work responsibilities of married women may be the source of much of the difference
in earnings and in job segregation between men and women.").
93. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); see generally Joan C. Williams &
Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who are Discrim-
inatedAgainst on the Job, 26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003).
94. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)-(5) (2010).
95. Debra Cassens Weiss, More Male Lawyers at Big Firms Taking Paternity Leave, A.B.A.
J. (July 10, 2008 6:39 AM), http://www.abajournal.comlnews/more-male_1awyers..
at-big-firms-takingpaternityjeave/#When:07:39:00Z.
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The unquestioned propriety of an economic system which over-
whelmingly values "men's work" as superior to "women's work" is
considered by many feminists to be a "linchpin issue" in explaining sex
inequality. 6 This linchpin theory posits that to challenge gendered no-
tions of care may in fact destabilize and denaturalize the system of
gender hierarchy under which women are subordinated as a class.
Thus, the theory goes, should men's role in caring for children be recog-
nized more seriously in the workplace, gendered assumptions about care
may be significantly destabilized. In defense of this proposition,
Charlesworth contends that achieving sex equality means more than
allowing women to access an institution, such as work. It means trans-
forming the structures and assumptions of that institution and "[i]t
would involve working to change men's behavior as much as women's."
Men's changing behavior within the institutions of work and the family
would allow women to escape the confines of their role as caretakers,
both in actuality and in the cultural imagination, and help pave the way
for them to achieve equal access to the benefits of employment." It is in
this capacity that paternity leave policies are disruptive to a system of
gender hierarchy which depends on naturalized sex stereotypes.
If this theory is true, and whose job it is to care really is a question
of sex equality, then a gender ideology framework should vindicate the
claim of a man who feels he has been discriminated against at work for
taking paternity leave, or perhaps because his employer fails to provide
any paternity leave at all. Rather than staking his claim on differential
treatment as between himself and the women at work, a gender ideology
framework would recast his claim as a workplace injustice that he has
incurred because of his failure to conform to masculine norms. His
claim could be made regardless of the fact that "similarly situated" wom-
en are treated as he is in the workplace (i.e., "all people taking time off
for family face consequences"), because that is not the question being
asked by the court. All that is relevant is whether that harm is caused by
the defendant's subscription to or perpetuation of gender ideology.
If one has doubts about the ability to incorporate such a "complex"
theory into a workable legal framework, the EU would again prove them
wrong. The EU demonstrated its ability to apply a gender ideology
framework to its equality legislation when it recognized paternity leave
96. See MAcKINNON, SEx EQUALTY, supra note 6, at 142.
97. See MAcKINNON, SEx EQUALITY, supra note 6, at 147; see generally WILLIAMS &
SEGAL, supra note 93.
98. Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waiving but Drowning. Gender Mainstreaming and Human
Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARv. Hum. RTs. J. 1, 18 (2005).
99. WILLIAMS & SEGAL, supra note 93 at 161-62.
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as a sex equality issue. It stated in Directive 2006/54 that rights to pa-
ternity leave would also be protected under the mandate to end sex
discrimination. The Directive states:
Those Member States which recognize such rights shall take
the necessary measures to protect working men and women
against dismissal due to exercising those rights and ensure that,
at the end of such leave, they are entitled to return to their
jobs or to equivalent posts on terms and conditions which are
no less favourable to them, and to benefit from any improve-
ment in working conditions to which they would have been
entitled during their absence.oo
By enforcing a man's right to take paternity leave and return to his job
without suffering punitive consequences, and furthermore, by framing
this right as a central concern in achieving sex equality, the EU took a
progressive step towards vindicating its mandate against sex discrimina-
tion.
CONCLUSIONS
Gender ideology wields the power to discipline and restrict indi-
viduals' abilities to contribute to society, access resources, and fulfill
their potentials. It is for this reason that combating sex inequality has
become a national initiative. But the disheartening realization that we
are not capable of simply imagining ourselves out from under this ideol-
ogy-that we instead must do the hard work of disassembling it-is
disempowering, overwhelming, even depressing. Furthermore, because
unraveling the complex interplay between gender ideology and experi-
ences of inequality is such a tough intellectual, political, and legal task,
we might be tempted instead to revert back and cling, however unrea-
sonably, to the seemingly simpler formula of categorical comparison.
But the nature of inequality is complex, and to imagine that it can be
disposed of in the abstract, without examining the impact of ideology
on persons and institutions, is impractical.
No doubt, handing the trier of fact the power to make legally sanc-
tioned statements about the admittedly difficult philosophical question
of whether gender ideology has caused the plaintiff's harm, could and likely
will result in some factual determinations that many will find counter-
productive to achieving sex equality. Nonetheless, it is arguable that
100. Council Directive 2006/54, art. 16, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 30.
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some (or even many) wayward determinations by the trier of fact will be
less destructive to the project of achieving sex equality than is the cur-
rent gender-blind discourse. Eliding this gendered analysis and imple-
implementing instead a sterile categorical framework has resulted in
stagnation in courts, who ultimately seem to be stepping away from the
prospect of multiplying protected categories in order to account for
plaintiffs' harms. Instead, courts have generally either given up, or else
simply denied that sex inequality is the source of the conflict in front of
them, since if the problem cannot be "solved" through their abstract
comparisons, it must simply not be a problem of sex inequality.
Gender ideology has been most persuasive and destructive in its
ability to remain invisible, even as many facially obvious forms of sex
discrimination have been successfully addressed by the law. Consequent-
ly, the law must respond: gender ideology must now be dug out from
our social subconscious and moved to the forefront of our legal and po-
litical discussions about sex inequality if we hope to continue to
progress. Because of the law's failure to expose gender ideology to the
heat of public criticism and scrutiny by the trier of fact, the ideology's
faulty assumptions, its unreasonable demands, and its great power to
shape experiences of injustice are left dangerously undisturbed. And so
the law must now change to adapt to an inequality that can no longer be
successfully contested by categorical comparisons.
Finally, if the prospect of such change gives one pause, solace might
be found in what Justice Scalia himself once argued: that the need for
considering such policy consequences in the evolution of our interpreta-
tions of law is so fundamental that it has been enshrined in Latin, Ratio
est legis anima; mutate legis ratione mutatur et lex: "The reason for the
law is its soul; when the reason for the law changes, the law changes as
well."m0t
101. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Defeence to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuICE L.J.
511, 515 (1989).
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